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A . Overview
The International Court o f Justice ("ICJ" or "Court") is a highly respected and authoritative judicial tribunal, lying at the center of the U . N . system, with an influence that extends well beyond the legal relations of the Parties that appear before it.' A t the same time, important constraints o n its jurisdiction preclude the Court f r o m resolving most disputes between States.^
Essential Information
The core instruments creating the ICJ are the U . N . Charter (especially Article 7(1) and Chapter X I V ) ' and the ICJ Statute." The U . N . Charter provides that the ICJ shall be the "principal judicial organ" of the United Nations and The ICJ Statute is based on the Statute of its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ"),' which was formed i n the aftermath of W o r l d W a r I in conjunction with the League of Nations ("the League"). Whereas the "political" League was based in Geneva, the "judicial" PCIJ was placed at a distance in the historically neutral country of the Netherlands, taking up residence in The Hague at the Peace Palace alongside the Permanent Court of Arbitration.' Principally operating f r o m 1922 to 1939, the PCIJ issued some twenty-seven advisory opinions and thirty-two judgments on a variety of matters, many concerning disputes arising under the post-World W a r I peace treaties and boundary disputes.'" Important defects in the PCIJ, however, were corrected with the ICJ. For example, membership in the League did not automatically entail membership in the Statute of the PCIJ, which was a disconnect that was thought to have weakened the PCIJ. A t the same time, considerable continuity was maintained between the two institutions. In addition to remaining in The Hague, the ICJ operates under a Statute that is almost verbatim the Statute of its predecessor, and hence a variety of procedural decisions of the PCIJ remain of direct importance for the ICJ today. Moreover, as the first global judicial court, the PCIJ began the judicial process of clarifying and codifying core elements of substantive international law and thus generated a stream of "first impression" findings that continue to be cited and built upon today by the ICJ. Together, these two institutions and their jurisprudence are often referred to informally as the "World Court." governments, candidates are not nominated directly by governments. Instead, potential judges are nominated by "national groups" formed i n accordance with the procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Hence, each State establishes a national group of four persons who are to be o f "recognized competence in international law" and of "high moral character."'^ Ihe national group, i n turn, decides whether to nominate a person f o r the IC J and, if so, whom.'' From the slate o f nominees, five judges of the ICJ are elected every three years for nine-year terms,'" thus allowing continuity o f membership even amidst change. The ICJ Statute provides that persons are to be elected based on their independence, character, and expertise, and not their nationality." Once elected, judges take no instructions f r o m governments. Further, they are precluded from participating i n cases i n which they were previously involved, which can have the effect of preventing some judges from sitting i n some cases involving their o w n States. A judge, however, is not prevented f r o m sitting i n a case involving the State of his or her nationality simply due to that connection."* The relatively lengthy term o f each judge is thought to help further insulate h i m or her f r o m deciding cases with an eye to reelection. Moreover, the judges are paid international civil servants; they cannot be recalled or dismissed by the governments of their nationalities. In the event of the resignation or death of a judge, the U . N . General Assembly and U . N . Security C o u n c i l hold a special election to fulfill the remaining term o f the vacancy."
While the judges are independent from governments, nationality and regional representation remain relevant when composing the Court. The Statute provides that no two judges may be o f the same nationality and that the judges are to be selected so that the "principal legal systems of the world" are represented." Though not required by the U . N . Charter or the ICJ Statute, a "gentlemen's agreement" of the U . N . membership has resulted i n seats on the Court being allocated so that a specific number of judges are elected f r o m each o f the principal regions o f the world: three judges fi-om African States; three judges from Asian States; two judges f r o m East European States; two judges f r o m Latin American and Caribbean States; and five judges f r om the Western European "and other" States." Further, while the permanent members of the Security Council do not have a "veto" with respect to the election of ICJ judges because only a majority of nine afiirmative votes is required from any combination of Council members, the five permanent members are in a position to influence stronglythe process. Further, it is generally accepted that having a judge on the Court of the nationality of the five permanent members is valuable i n buttressing the authority and credibility of the Court, such that it is no surprise that a judge of each permanent member is represented on the Court.^° Perhaps the most striking indication of the continuing relevance of nationality is the abUity for a State that has no judge of its nationality sitting on the Court to appoint an ad hoc judge to sit in a contentious case, who can be of the State's nationality or some other nationality.^' The presence of such party-appointed adjudicators presumably helps draw States into the Court's jurisdiction because, in some sense, it allows the perspective of the State to be weU represented during the Court's deliberations. A t the same time, given the size o f the Court, one or two ad hoc judges are not i n a position to dictate the outcome of the Court's judgment; indeed, the vote of one ad hoc judge i n many instances simply oflFsets that of the other. This element of the Court's procedure at times has been criticized as diminishing the Court's overaU independence from the Parties who appear before it.
A s discussed below, the exact law to be applied by the Court in any particular case may be limited by the scope of the Court's jurisdiction in that case. A s a general matter, however. Article 38(1) of the Statute provides that the Court is to decide disputes "in accordance with international law" by applying four sources: (a) treaties; (b) customary international law; (c) general principles o f law; and (d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the "most highly qualified publicists of the various nations."" Article 38(1) has had an influence well beyond the Court itself, as the classic starting point of any international law analysis entails consideration of these four sources.
Jurisdiction
States cannot be sued before the ICJ without their consent. Joining the United Nations and thereby ipso facto becoming a party to the ICJ's Statute does not automatically expose a State to the Court's jurisdiction.-^' Adhering to the ICJ's Statute simply opens the door for a State to sue or be sued before the Court, but it does not allow the State to go through that door. Instead, some further f o rm of consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction must exist. This requirement of further state consent is why most of the 192 U . N . Member States have never appeared before the Court in a contentious case and why the Court is regarded as an important, but not dominant, player i n the field of international dispute resolution.
There are three means by which a State can express consent to the jurisdiction of the Court. States can accept the Court's jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis for the adjudication of an existing dispute.^" For example, in July 2010, Burkina Faso and Niger jointly submitted a frontier dispute to the Court for the purpose of determining their mutual boundary in a particular sector.^' While such a dispute is "contentious" i n the sense that there are differing views between the two States as to the relevant facts or law, both States agree ah initio to bring the dispute to the Court for resolution.
Alternatively, States can accept the Court's jurisdiction by concluding a bilateral or multilateral treaty that provides for future jurisdiction over certain issues in the event that a dispute arises.^* This form of jurisdiction is limited not just by the need to find a relevant treaty, but also by the terms of jurisdiction set forth i n that treaty. The relevant treaty might provide for broad jurisdiction, such as the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement ("Pact of Bogota"), which provides i n Article X X X I : "Parties declare that they recognize, in relation to any other American State, the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory ipso facto, without the necessity of any special agreement so long as the present Treaty is i n force, i n all disputes of a juridical nature that arise among them...."" For example, Costa Rica invoked this provision i n November 2010 to seize the Court of jurisdiction i n a dispute against Nicaragua, which concerned an alleged incursion into and occupation of Costa Rican territory by Nicaragua/* But the treaty invoked might provide for m u c h narrower jurisdiction, limited only to the specific subject matter o f the treaty itself. For example, the Convention Against Genocide sets forth various obligations of States with respect to preventing and punishing genocide. Article IX provides that disputes between parties arising under the convention shall be submitted to the ICJ at the request o f one of the parties." Other types o f disputes unrelated to the Convention cannot be submitted to the Court. The effect of such limited jurisdiction is that disputes can sometimes be presented to the Court i n a rather skewed fashion. For instance, when Georgia sought to sue Russia for an alleged incursion by Russia into Georgia's territory in 2008, the only treaty available to which both States were a Party that provided for the Court's jurisdiction was the Convention o n the Elimination o f A l l Forms of Racial Discrimination.™ Consequentiy, Georgia's case was entirely cast i n terms o f whether Russia's conduct constituted racial discrimination within the meaning of the Convention, not i n terms of whether it constituted an unlawfiil use o f force or intervention i n Georgia."
Since this form o f jurisdiction is predicated on the presence of a treaty obligation accepting the Court's jurisdiction, it is critical to assess whether a State, i n j o i n i n g a multilateral treaty, filed a reservation limiting or rejecting the provision that provides for the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, when the United States ratified the Convention Against Genocide i n 1988, it included a reservation stating that, before any dispute could be submitted to the Court under Article IX, "the specific consent of the United States is required i n each case."'^ Consequently, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro) against Serbia i n 1999, the ICJ found that there was no jurisdiction and dismissed the case/' The third way i n which jurisdiction may arise is under the "optional clause" or "compulsory jurisdiction." Here, the State Parties to the ICJ Statute m a y make a unilateral declaration that "they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, i n relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court i n all legal d i s p u t e s . . Even i f the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over a claim, the Court might regard a claim as inadmissible, (although the exact distinction between the two concepts is not always clear). Thus, i n certain cases, the Court has relied upon a rule of customary international law known as the "local remedies rule." Before a State may espouse a claim o n behalf of its national, it must show that the national has exhausted all available legal remedies i n the courts and administrative agencies o f the State against which the claim is brought; failure to do so will make the claim inadmissible/' The rule is designed to permit a State to remedy a wrong at the national level before it is transformed into a dispute o n the international plane, where it might unnecessarily disrupt relations between States. Moreover, it provides the Court with an opportunity to decline to pass upon a dispute that might place it i n direct conflict with the tendency o f some States toward strong constitutional autonomy. Other forms o f admissibility issues can arise, such as i n the context o f the standing o f a State to bring a case"*" or mootness of the issue presented i n the case.""
Separate from the Court's jurisdiction over contentious cases between two States, the Court also has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions o n legal questions.*^ The advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ may only be invoked by U . N . organs and b y the specialized agencies of the United Nations w h o have been authorized to do so.*" Although advisory opinions are non-binding, they do have some juridical authority. A m o n g other things, they can legitimate certain conduct o f States and organizations, and they invariably have significance for a legal system i n which judicial precedents are scarce.*''
Procedural Overview
The key instrument with respect to the procedure o f the Court, other than Chapter III o f the ICJ Statute, are the Rules of Court (especially Part III), which were adopted i n 1978 and thereafter amended on occasion.*' Written and oral pleadings are submitted to the Court i n either English or French, after which the Court privately deliberates and issues its decision. Contentious cases are often heard i n phases, with separate decisions issued on: (I) requests for provisional (or interim) measures of protection;*' (2) requests A contentious case commences with the filing of an Application to the Court, specifying the nature o f the dispute, the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, the alleged violations, a n d the remedy sought."' If provisional measures of protection are sought, an expedited hearing and order will take place for disposition of that particular request,"' but normally the case proceeds with greater deliberation. In such an expedited proceeding, and without prejudging the outcome o n the merits, the Court will consider whether there appears to be prima facie jurisdiction and a danger of irreparable damage due to ongoing conduct.'" Otherwise, after a meeting of the Parties with the President of the Court, a schedule is set for the filing of a Memorial and Counter-Memorial, which may also be followed by a second round o f written pleadings i n the f o r m o f a Reply and Rejoinder." If a Respondent State seeks to challenge the Court's jurisdiction over the dispute, its objection must be filed within three months after the filing of the Memorial." Further, if the Respondent wishes to file a counter-claim against the Applicant, it may do so along vnth its Counter-Memorial, so long as the counter-claim is directly connected with the subject matter of the claim and is within the Court's j u r i s d i c t i o n . "
The written pleadings are not made public until the date of the oral hearing, which is open to the public. A t the oral hearing, there is typically a first round of presentations by the Applicant and the Respondent, followed by a second round. The judges of the Court rarely ask questions; when they do, it often occurs at the end of the oral proceeding, with a request that the Parties respond i n writing within a short time period. The failure o f a Party to appear before the Court for the written or oral proceedings does not prevent the Court from proceeding with the case. The Court, however, must still determine that the claim before it is well founded i n fact and law because default judgments are not issued.'" ICJ Statute Article 26 allows the Court to establish a chamber of judges to decide a case," which the Court typically is inclined to do i f two States appearing before it request such a chamber and identify the judges they wish appointed to the chamber. Moreover, the chamber can consist o f any combination of judges; unlike the PCIJ Statute, there is n o requirement that the chamber represent "the principal legal systems of the w o r l d . " " For instance, i n Gulf of Maine, Canada and the U n i t e d States informed the Court that they desired a chamber consisting o f five ICJ judges identified by the Parties.'^ Some special rules apply i n the context of chamber proceedings, but most procedures remain the same and chamber judgments are regarded as judgments of the Court as a whole.'* Judgments issued by the ICJ i n contentious cases are final, without further appeal, and b i n d i n g o n the parties." A t the same time, i f the meaning of the judgment is unclear, a Party may request an interpretation from the Court.'" Further, i f an important fact u n k n o w n at the time of the proceedings comes to light, a Party may request a revision of the judgment." In addition to the judgment reached by the majority (with the President casting a second vote i f necessary to break a tie)," each judge may issue a concurring o r dissenting opinion or declaration.'' Once the judgment is issued, each U.N. Member State "undertakes to comply with the decision o f the International Court of Justice i n any case to which it is a party."'" Yet i n crafting the U . N . Charter and the ICJ Statute, States elected not to include any provisions expressly addressing the legal effect o f ICJ judgments within national legal systems, such as whether they provide a basis for private rights of action i n national courts. Rather, the recourse envisaged by the U . N . Charter is for the victorious party to appeal non-compliance to the U . N . Security C o u n c i l , "which may, i f it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment."" T o date, i n only one case has the Applicant State, In S.S. "Lotus,"''^ the PCIJ was aslced to decide whether Turkey could exercise national jurisdiction over a French national for negligent conduct that occurred on a French vessel, which resulted in a collision on the high seas that harmed a Turkish vessel and nationals. In determining whether any rule of customary international law prohibited Turkey's exercise of national jurisdiction, the Court considered the nature and scope of state practice on the issue, findings of international and national tribunals, and the writings o f publicists. This approach has influenced subsequent judicial analyses of whether a norm of customary international law exists. Further, the Court articulated a particular perspective when assessing the lawfulness of state practice -now commonly referred to as the "Lotus principle" -in which a State's conduct is presumed lawful unless a prohibition against the conduct can be found i n international law. According to the Court:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed." The relationship of treaties to customary international law was at issue i n North Sea Continental ShelfJ'' where Denmark and Germany urged the Court to find a customary international law rule requiring the use of an equidistance line for delimitation of the continental shelf between adjacent States when those States could not otherwise agree upon delimitation. Denmark and Germany in part argued that Article 6 of the 1958 Convention o n the Continental Shelf" had helped generate a rule of customary international law binding upon Germany, even though Germany had not ratified or acceded to the Convention. W h i l e accepting that a treaty provision can help create a n o r m of customary law, the Court rejected the argument in that instance by an analysis that focused o n whether the relevant treaty provision had a "fiindamentally norm-creating character," the length of time the treaty provision was in force, the number of States adhering to the treaty, state practice since enactment of the treaty by both Parties and non-Parties, and whether that practice evinced a belief that the relevant norm was legally-compelled.^'
The Court returned to this issue in Military and Paramilitary Activities, this time in the context of whether Article 2(4) of the Charter -prohibiting transnational uses of force -had generated not just a treaty obligation upon U . N . Member States, but also an obligation under customary international law. One problem i n reaching such a finding was the fact that there had been numerous incidents of transboundary uses of force i n the post-Charter era, which arguably defeated any consistent state practice establishing a customary norm. The Court, however, found that the customary norm did exist. In a finding highly relevant for the theory of customary international law, the Court stated:
It is not to be expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete consistency, from the use of force or from intervention in each other's internal affairs. The Court does not consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule." The Court has recognized, however, that as a customary norm emerges, it is possible for any particular State to opt out o f the norm, so long as it unambiguously and persistently objects to the new norm while it is emerging a n d thereafter. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the Court found that a customary rule Umiting the drawing o f a baseline across a bay to ten miles had not emerged, but went o n to say that, even if such a n o r m had emerged, Norway would not be bound "inasmuch as she has always opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast."'* A t the same time, the Court has maintained that certain norms o f international law are so fiindamental i n nature that no State may derogate from them, as either a persistent objector or b y means of a new treaty obligation. I n Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court referred to the view with apparent approval that Article 2(4) o f the U . N . Charter "constitutes a conspicuous example of a rule i n international law having the character of ;'ws cogens,"''^ and, i n Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo, the Court found that the prohibition o n genocide was a norm having jus cogens character, though that alone was not a basis f o r establishing the Court's jurisdiction over an alleged violation.*" b. Treaty Law The W o r l d Court has interpreted many treaties over the course of its existence. In its recent holdings, the Court has helped soUdify key legal standards set forth i n the Vienna Convention o n the Law o f Treaties,*' even i n circumstances where that treaty was not directly binding upon the Parties with respect to the treaty at hand. O n the important issue o f how treaties should be interpreted, the Court stated i n Genocide Convention, brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina, that what obligations the Convention imposes upon the parties to it depends on the ordinary meaning of the terms of the Convention read in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. To confirm the meaning resulting from that process or to remove ambiguity or obscurity or a manifestly absurd or unreasonable result, the supplementary means of interpretation to which recourse may be had include the preparatory work of the Convention and the circumstances of its conclusion. Those propositions, reflected in Articles 31 and A particularly interesting case concerning the circumstances under which a State may avoid a treaty obligation is Gabcikovo-Nagymaros ProjectP In that case, the Court rejected Hungary's "changed circumstances" (sometimes referred to as reijus sic stantibus or force majeure) argument that a treaty concluded during the Cold W a r between two communist governmentsHungary and Czechoslovakia -for the building of a hydroelectric project along the Danube River had been radically transformed by the fall o f c o mmunism i n Eastern Europe, the rise of environmentalism, and the alleged diminishing economic viability o f the venture, thereby allowing Hungary to terminate the treaty. According to the Court, the prevailing national political situation and economic systems of the Parties when the treaty was concluded were not closely hnked to the object and purpose of the treaty, the economic viability of this particular project had not been radically transformed, and new developments i n environmental knowledge or environmental law were foreseeable when the treaty was concluded.*"
The Court also rejected Hungary's argimient that it was impossible to complete the project as contemplated i n the treaty, given that an essential object was to do this through joint exploitation i n an environmentally sound manner. According to the Court, the treaty contemplated mechanisms f o r altering the project through negotiation i f there were environmental issues, and any difficulty with joint exploitation was attributable to Hungary's own conduct in trying to withdraw from the project.*' A s such, the Court accepted the availability of an "impossibility" argument, but only i n extreme circumstances.
c. Other Sources Given the existence of numerous international organizations, the Court at times has been called upon to consider the normative value o f resolutions adopted by organs of international organizations. In the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the Court was urged by some States to find a prohibition o n the use o r threat to use nuclear weapons within a series o f U . N . General Assembly resolutions. The Court acknowledged that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding, may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances, provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the emergence of an opinio juris. To estabhsh whether this is true of a given General Assembly resolution, it is necessary to look at its content and the conditions of its adoption; it is also necessary to see whether an opinio juris exists as to its normative character. Or a series of resolutions may show the gradual evolution of the opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule."'
In that instance, however, the Court viewed the relevant resolutions as not establishing the existence of a norm prohibiting nuclear weapons; the resolutions in question were too equivocal and, when adopted, had garnered substantial numbers of negative votes or abstentions.*' Ultimately, relying upon principles emanating from treaties o n the law of war, the Court found that the use of nuclear weapons, as a general matter, would be unlawful, but i n certain extreme circmnstances involving the very survival of a State, such use might be lawfiil.**
Subjects of International Law
In the course of its decisions, the Court has made important pronouncements relevant to the various "subjects" of international law, including States, international organizations, and persons. For example, i n its advisory opinion on Kosovo's declaration of independence, the Court was asked to opine o n whether that declaration was unlawful, given Kosovo's status as a province of Serbia, which opposed Kosovo's independence. To a certain extent, placement of the matter before the Court was viewed as a test as to whether a new State had been formed. Staying within the narrow confines o f the question placed before it, the Court did not directly pass upon Kosovo's statehood, nor upo n whether other States might recognize that statehood. Instead, the Court simply concluded that the declaration of independence issued by Kosovo's leaders violated neither general international law nor the specific regime set up by the Security Council for international administration of K o s o vo after the 1998-99 crisis.*'
W i t h respect to international organizations, the Court issued a landmark ruling i n its 1949 advisory opinion o n Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations.'^ Coming early i n the life o f the United
Nations, and with implications for all U . N . speciaUzed agencies and arguably all international organizations, the opinion tackles whether the United Nations has sufficient "personality" separate f r o m its Member States so as to allow it to pursue a diplomatic claim. Based upon an analysis of the U.N. Charter, including the powers and status conferred upon its organs, the opinion found that sufficient personality existed to support pursuit of a diplomatic claim both for direct injury to the organization and injury to persons i n the employ of the organization because the latter type of claim was not only efficient, but also helped protect the integrity of the United Nations. Moreover, the opinion found that such a claim could be brought not just against a U . N . Member State, but even against a non-U.N. Member State, because "fifty States, representing the vast majority of the members of the international community [in 1945 ], had the power, i n conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with capacity to bring international claims."" That finding, which solidified the legal status of international organizations as subjects of international law, arguably helped pave the way for the human rights movement by vividly demonstrating that States were no longer the sole possessor of rights and obligations on the international plane.
Rules on State Responsibility
Especially in two of its cases -Military and Paramilitary Activities brought by Nicaragua and Genocide Convention brought by Bosnia-Herzegovina -the Court has significantly confirmed and clarified the standards for attributing conduct to a State. In Genocide Convention, the Court asserted that conduct perpetrated by persons or entities having the status of "organs" of a government under its internal law are acts attributable to that government's State.'^ Persons or entities that are not state organs may nevertheless be equated with state organs "provided that in fact the persons, groups or entities act i n 'complete dependence' on the State, of which they are ultimately merely the instrument."" If the persons or entities are neither a state organ nor acting in complete dependence on the State, their conduct may nevertheless be attributed to the State i f it can be shown that they 9-36_Qiorg8lIi_f=3'ndd 27 10/6/2011 5:11:22 PM acted in accordance with that State's instructions or under its "effective control." It must however be shown that this "effective control" was exercised, or that the State's instructions were given, in respect of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the persons or groups of persons having committed the violations.'" Even i f the conduct was not attributable to the State at the time it was undertaken, it can become so i f the government thereafter expresses approval of or endorses the conduct.'' Normally, breaches of international law occur as between the two States directly involved i n the underlying conduct, such as harm by one State to the national of another. However, i n Barcelona Traction, the Court adopted the concept of obligations erga omnes, meaning obligations owed by a State towards the international community as a whole. For those obhgations, all States have an interest in whether the obligation is upheld. According to the Court, "[s]uch obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, f r o m the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also f r o m the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination."'' This concept of erga omnes obligations has not led to widespread advancement of claims by States; indeed, the Court itself seemed to disfavor the idea that all States could pursue claims based on such obligations when it dismissed cases brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa for abuse o f its international mandate i n South West Afi-ica." Nevertheless, this concept has helped reinforce the idea that certain international obligations are especially important and that the broad community of States has an interest i n and can speak to whether those obligations are being transgressed.
Privileges and Immunities in National Systems
In Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000,^^ the Court considered the legality o f the issuance of a Belgian arrest warrant against the Republic of the Congo's M i nister of Foreign Affairs for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, pursuant to a Belgian criminal law statute that allowed for "universal 9-36_Giargetti_F3.in(ld 28 jurisdiction," or jurisdiction i n circumstances where Belgium's direct interests or nationals were not involved. The Court declined to pass upon the permissibility of such a statute" and instead focused on the immunity o f an incumbent Foreign Minister from criminal jurisdiction. Since no relevant treaties spoke to the matter, the Court's judgment turned upon customary international law, thus creating a precedent of relevance for all other comparable circumstances. The Court found that under customary international law, state officials are entitled to immunity f r o m national jurisdiction when they travel abroad -including from charges of war crimes or crimes against hiunanity -so as to allow for the effective performance of their functions o n behalf of States.'™ A t the same time, the Court noted that "[j]urisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offenses; it cannot exonerate the person to w h o m it applies f r o m all criminal responsibility,""" thus potentially leaving open the door to prosecution after the official leaves office.
O n several occasions, the Court has also addressed the protections accorded under the Vienna Conventions on diplomatic and consular immunities,'"^ thereby confirming their core provisions. In its 1980 judgment in U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the Court unequivocally condemned the seizure by Iran of U.S. diplomatic and consular staff, ordered their release, and ordered the restoration of the U.S. embassy and consulate premises, property, archives, and documents."" In a series of decisions against the United States, the Court upheld the right of an alien to be notified of the right to contact his or her consulate about the alien's detention.'"'' Moreover, the Court maintained that a failure to provide such notification required U.S. courts to review and reconsider convictions of aliens o n death row as a remedy, so as to see whether the lack of notification was prejudicial.'"' Althoug h U.S. courts did not uniformly provide such review and reconsideration,"" the Court's decisions prompted the U.S. Government to embark on a widespread campaign to educate state and local police officials in the United States as to the obligation to provide such notification to aliens when they are detained.
Injury to Aliens and Human Rights
The Court has firmly established in international law certain procedural rules relating to the protection of foreign nationals or their investments in host States, such as the continuous nationality rule"" or rules on protection of shareholders in corporations.'"* For example, as previously noted, the Court has reaffirmed the "rule that local remedies must first be exhausted before international proceedings may be instituted."'"' Yet the Court has helped refine the rule, such as by clarifying that there might be exceptional c i r c u mstances that relieve the injured party from exhausting local remedies (e.g., where they effectively have been pursued by the bankruptcy trustee of an expropriated subsidiary)."" The burden of showing that local remedies exist, however, falls upon the host State. Even then, while the local remedies that must be exhausted include all remedies of a legal nature, judicial redress as well as redress before administrative bodies, administrative remedies can only be taken into consideration for purposes of the local remedies rule if they are aimed at vindicating a right and not at obtaining a favour, unless they constitute an essential prerequisite for the admissibility of subsequent contentious proceedings.'" 9-36_Glorge«LF3,ind(l 30 10/6/2011 5:11:22 PM a serious risk of altering the demographic composition of "occupied Palestinian territory."'" A s such, it both impeded "the exercise by the Palestinian people of its right to self-determination" and constituted a violation o f Article 12(1), protecting freedom of movement and choice of residence, a n d Article 17(1), protecting privacy, family and home,"** of the International Covenant on C i v i l and Political Rights ("ICCPR").'" A m o n g the important findings of the Court i n this advisory opinion was that the I C C P R apphes not just to a State's conduct within its o w n territory, but also "is applicable i n respect of acts done by a State i n the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory."'"
In the Ahmadou Sadio Diallo, the Court concluded that an alien's expulsion violated his rights under ICCPR Article 13, but the Court also passed upon human rights standards within a regional human rights treaty, i n that instance. Article 12 (4) of the African Charter o n H u m a n and Peoples' Rights.'" Both the global and regional standards only allow expulsion pursuant to a decision taken i n accordance with the law. Further, the Court found that the alien's arrest and detention prior to expulsion violated I C C P R Article 9 and African Charter Article 6, both of which protect the liberty and security o f a person.'" In doing so, the C o u r t is helping to harmonize global and regional human rights systems.
Use of Force
The ICJ has issued several decisions of significance o n the topic of transnational uses of force. Perhaps the most famous is Military and Paramilitary Activities, brought by Nicaragua against the United States i n the mid-1980s, i n which the C o u r t made several important findings with respect to the right of self-defense. A m o n g other things, the Court concluded that certain types o f conduct -the laying of mines i n Nicaraguan internal or territorial waters or attacks o n Nicaraguan ports, oi l installations, and a naval base -constitute a violation of the international prohibition on the use o f force as reflected i n U . N . Charter Article 2(4).'"» While sometimes use o f force can be justified i n self-defense, contemporary international lav? as reflected i n U . N . Charter Article 51 requires that the State be responding to an "armed attack" that is imputable to the State against which force is being used.'^° In this case, allegations that Nicaragua was sending armed bands, groups, or irregulars across a border against E l Salvador, or providing weapons or logistical support to such groups, d i d not qualify as an "armed attack" because that conduct did not involve acts o f armed force o f such gravity that they amounted to an armed attack.'^' N o r was there sufficient evidence that the support was imputable to Nicaragua. Even i f an armed attack by Nicaragua d i d exist, for the United States to engage i n collective self-defense i n support of E l Salvador or any other State i n the region, there must be a contemporaneous request for such assistance f r o m the victim State, which the Court concluded d i d not exist o n the facts o f the case.'" Furthermore, i f truly acting i n coUective self-defense, a State is obhgated under Article 51 to notify the U . N . Security C o u n c f l that it is doing so, a step not taken by the United States i n this case.'" Even if all those hurdles were overcome, the Court stressed that any U.S. act of self-defense must satisfy the requirements of necessity and proportionality. Here, the U.S. conduct was not necessary because E l Salvador had already successfully repulsed the rebel offensive at the time the United States acted and was not proportionate because the relevant conduct (e.g., mining o f ports and attacks on o i l installations) d i d not correlate to Nicaragua's aid to E l Salvador rebels.'" The Court returned to the issue of necessity a n d proportionality i n Oil Platforms when assessing the legality o f U.S. attacks i n 1987-88 upon three Iranian offshore ofl platforms i n the Persian Gulf Whfle the United States convinced the Court that the relevant provision o f the underlying bflateral treaty could not have been violated by the conduct,'^' the Court proceeded to engage i n an extensive analysis of why the U.S. attacks o n the oU platforms violated international law o n the use o f force, including the necessity and proportionality principles.'^'
Land and Maritime Boundary Disputes
One of the most important roles played by the Court has been to authoritatively delimit land and maritime boundaries placed before it by two States.
The significance of such decisions lies less i n the precedential value of any given decision and more i n the pragmatic value of resolving a border dispute that, i n m a n y instances, has led or could lead to armed conflict. For example, a disputed area rich i n minerals existed along the border o f Libya and Chad, including the Aouzou Strip. While Chad maintained that the area was part of its territory, Libya occupied and administered the area. The dispute ultimately led to armed conflict between the two States in 1986-87. Thereafter, the two States agreed to submft the matter to the Court, which in 1994 f o u n d that the territory fell within Chad, resulting i n a Libyan withdrawal of its forces."'
In the realm o f maritime disputes, two early decisions -North Sea Continental Shelf^^ and Continental Shelf between Libya and T u n i s i a ' " -reUed o n "equitable principles" to divide a shelf where there was no interruption i n the natural prolongation o f the coasts. While the Court indicated that such principles required certain approaches, e.g., that a delimitation should not refashion nature or that special circumstances could be taken into account,"" the decisions provided little guidance as to what was meant by "equitable principles" and h o w they might be applied i n other cases. In Gulf of Maine, a chamber of the Court indicated that it was "unrewarding, especially i n a new and still unconsohdated field like that involving the quite recent extension o f the claims o f States to areas which were until yesterday zones of the high seas, to look to general international law to provide a ready-made set o f rules that can be used for solving any delimitation problems that arise.""' In that spirit, some decisions o f the Court with respect to relatively smooth coastlines have largely applied an "equidistance line," the line that connects all points at an equal distance from the baselines o f both the nations, while others have taken account of unusual coastlines so as to use a different method, such as an angle-bisector approach.'"
Law of the Sea and Environmental Law
Separate f r o m its maritime boundary dispute cases, the Court has addressed important issues on the law o f the sea, with its decisions both influencing and being influenced by efforts at treaty codification since the early 1950s. For example, i n Corfu Channel in 1949, the Court asserted that "States i n time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used f o r international navigation between two parts o f the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal State, provided that the passage is i>i«oce«f."'" This finding strongly influenced codification o f the concepts of "innocent passage" through the territorial sea and "transit passage" through straits. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries in 1951, the Court accepted Norway's method o f drawing straight baselines connecting its coastal islands, rocks and reefs, using language that directly influenced the text of the 1958 and 1982 Law o f the Sea Conventions.""
In the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases brought by the United Kingdom and Germany against Iceland, the Court rejected Iceland's unilateral claim to a preferential fishing zone extending fifty nautical miles f r o m its baselines, but equally rejected the applicant States' contention that no such preferential rights could exist outside the territorial sea.'" W i t h an eye to the ongoing negotiations of the 1982 Law o f the Sea C o n v e n t i o n , the Court accepted that the law o f the sea was evolving so as to allow preferential fishing rights for coastal States extending beyond their territorial sea, which i n turn helped usher i n the concept of the exclusive economic zone i n the 1982 Convention. Even before entry into force o f the convention, the Court would declare that it was "incontestable that...the exclusive economic zone...is shown by the practice of States to have become a part o f customary law.""'
Though not actually a case involving environmental law, the Court's decision in Corfu Channel foreshadowed the emergence of the field of international environmental treaties. In Corfu Channel, the Court stated that Albania's obligation to notify others of the presence of mines in Albanian water arose i n part f r o m "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."'" That finding was echoed i n later "soft law" instruments,"* which i n turn helped spawn treaty regimes on transboundary pollution."' The Court also issued an oft-cited statement about the importance of the global environment i n the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, by recognizing that the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations unborn. Tlie existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.'* In that opinion, however, the Court declined to apply such norms to the issue of the legality of the possession or use o f nuclear weapons, finding that the "most directly relevant applicable law governing the question of which it is seised" was the law o n use o f force and o n war, with its various treaties addressing the use o f weaponry and the protection o f civilians in time o f war.'*'
C . Conclusion
The International Court o f Justice (as was the case for its predecessor, the Permanent Court o f International Justice) is not at the apex of an appellate system of international courts, nor does it have wide-ranging jurisdiction over all disputes arising among States. Nevertheless, as the judicial wing o f the United Nations, the C o u r t stands as the most authoritative Court for the interpretation of general rules of international law, with its decisions regularly cited by other global, regional, and national courts. Further, despite its limited jurisdiction, the Court has addressed numerous important disputes among States and issued advisory opinions that have greatly shaped and influenced the development of international law. Id. 5 34.
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